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Abstract 
After the “socialist revolution” in 1977, the Seychelles introduced a universal social 
pension, free education and free health care. This path of the Seychelles to universal 
social policies is unique in several regards. On the one hand, the policies were fi-
nanced by economic growth triggered by a non-dogmatic economic policy that fo-
cused on three partly state-led, partly privately driven key sectors. Especially im-
portant were services (tourism, finance) that replaced the colonial plantation econ-
omy. On the other hand, the country also successfully navigated the Cold War by at-
tracting capitalist development aid to finance “socialist” policies. Finally, social poli-
cies contributed to a relatively high standard of living and persisted throughout eco-
nomic and political liberalisation. 
Keywords: Seychelles, socialist revolution, universal social policy, social pension, free 
health care 
Introduction 
Guinea under Ahmed Sékou Touré, the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, or the Somali Democratic Republic under Mohamed Siad Barre: 
these are just a few examples of self-proclaimed socialist regimes in sub-Saharan Africa that 
many observers would associate with low standards of living for the vast majority of the popu-
lation. However, the picture is different in the Seychelles, although the political party that took 
power in 1977 and declared a “socialist revolution” still puts the president more than 40 years 
later. 
The standard of living of course can be measured by different indictors. Among them is 
the Human Development Index (HDI), which includes life expectancy at birth, expected years 
of schooling, and gross national income per capita (UNDP 2015). Life expectancy is seen as a 
proxy for health status.3 Leaving conceptual and data measurement problems aside, the HDI 
2015 data in Appendix 1 show that the Seychelles is the second-best-ranking sub-Saharan Af-
rican country after Mauritius (see Campling and Rosalie 2006 for some older data). A new-
born baby in the Seychelles can expect to live 73.1 years and be schooled for 13.4 years, and 
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having parents that earn a gross national income of US$ 23,300 at purchasing power parity 
(ppp) per capita. These data and the ones used later on in this contribution should of course 
be treated with caution. However, it is beyond doubt that the standard of living in the Sey-
chelles outperforms almost all other sub-Saharan African countries. Still according to these 
data, the Seychelles also outperform Costa Rica and Brazil, two countries widely discussed in 
the social policy literature.  
Of course, per capita income is an average value that might say little about social inequali-
ties. Indeed, the country has a rather high Gini coefficient measuring income inequality, alt-
hough the estimates vary considerably. The UNDP (2015: 217) estimate is at 65.8, considera-
bly higher than the 45.9 indicated by the National Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank 
(2016: 11). Inequality seems to have increased considerably between 1999 and 2006 (OPM 
2010: 4) and then decreased again (Campling et al. et al. 2011: 70). It is generally assumed that 
a small number of families control the economy. While this clouds the picture, a look at pov-
erty rates reveals a much rosier picture than other sub-Saharan African countries. The data in 
Appendix 2 show that less than a quarter of the population lives on less than US$ 10 a day and 
is thus classified as either poor or low income. While internationally standardised poverty 
definitions allow for comparison across countries, national poverty lines are closer to the 
ground. Using such a poverty line, the National Bureau of Statistics (2015: 1) estimates the 
poverty rate at 39.3%. However, included in this rate are people who still have a certain stand-
ard of living, and own fridges, washing machines, or air conditioners. There are remarkable 
regional and social inequalities in the levels of poverty (National Bureau of Statistics and 
World Bank 2016). In a nutshell, households of less educated, unmarried single parents living 
in and around the capital Victoria are most affected by poverty. 
This contribution is less interested in explaining regional differences within the country, 
but more in the question how economic and social policies might help explain this high 
standard of living. What are the continuities and discontinuities in these policies before and 
after the “socialist revolution”? To tackle these questions, the next section discusses the politi-
cal economy before the “socialist revolution”, followed by a discussion of the universal social 
policies and, thereafter, of the pragmatic economic and foreign policies that financed them. 
The next section works out the persistence of these social policies in the context of economic 
and political liberalisation and, most recently, a loss of the majority in parliament. After a 
wrap up of the results, the final section discusses some implications for the international liter-
ature on social policies and ends with an outlook. 
The political economy before the “socialist revolution” 
Like other small countries, the Seychelles do not receive much scientific attention and not 
many readers will be familiar with the context. This context is thus presented in this section in 
some depth and with a perspective focusing on the colonial political economy. The Seychelles 
are an archipelago of around 115 islands, the main island being more than 1,500 kilometres 
away from the East African continent in the Indian Ocean. Some of the islands are of granite 
and have some elevation. However, many are of coral and threatened by climate change 
(Michel 2014: 51). The islands have a surface area of 455 square kilometres. This is a little less 
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than the Swiss Canton of Obwalden or a little bit bigger than the Free Hanseatic City of Bre-
men in Germany. This is, of course, a mainland-centric perspective. Including the maritime 
exclusive economic zone rich in fish and potentially minerals, the country has a surface of 1.5 
million square kilometres, four times Germany (Michel 2016: 3). In 2015, the resident popula-
tion was slightly above 93,000 (SPF 2015: 10). 
The island was uninhabited when it became known among Portuguese and other West 
European seamen in the early sixteenth century. Initially, it was mainly used by pirates. Na-
ming the islands after Vicomte Moreau des Sechelles, the French took possession of them in 
1756 (Mancham 2009: ix). From 1768, French planters (the grands blancs) started to colonize 
the islands using African slaves whose descendants make up the vast majority of today’s popu-
lation. As a supply station for European trade with India and the East Indies, the islands’ plan-
tations produced fresh fruits, coconut oil, timber and tortoises for the ships, but also products 
for the European markets such as sugar and cotton (Campling et al. 2011: 6). With the treaty 
of Paris (1814), the islands were ceded to Great Britain, which administered them together 
with Mauritius until 1903. Mostly interested in keeping “the islands from becoming a burden 
on the imperial ledger”, the administration ensured that the inhabitants “received little atten-
tion and few services” (Campling et al. 2011: 8). Besides the Creoles and some French and 
English, the population consisted of the descendants of Chinese shopkeepers and of inden-
tured Indian labourers brought to work the coconut plantations after the abolition of slavery 
in 1833. Without slaves, sugar and cotton plantations became unprofitable and were replaced 
by less labour-intensive coconut plantations. Copra, the dried meat of coconuts, became the 
main export product. It had a veritable boom in the 1940s and was still central in the early 
1970s (Campling et al. 2011: 9).4 
After 1888, the Seychelles had administrative and executive councils separate from Mauri-
tius, and from 1903, the Seychelles became a crown colony on its own. Initially, representation 
in councils was given to some grands blancs only, but from 1948, taxpayers had universal suf-
frage and elected representation. Their Seychelles Taxpayers and Landowners Associations 
(STLA) fought against some reform-minded Governors such as Eustace Fiennes or Percy 
Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, who wanted to raise taxes to finance social services for the Creole pop-
ulation or grant the Creole population suffrage and thus representation (Franda 1982; Scarr 
1983, 2000; McAteer 2008). There was of course also creole activism for universal suffrage and 
these attempts were also influenced by shifting political majorities in London. The first at-
tempts to create local political parties were short-lived, and both the Seychelles People’s Con-
vention Party (SPCP) founded in May 1959 by Harry Payet and the Independence Party 
founded by social reformer Charles Evariste Collet in 1960 failed to make much impact (Shil-
lington 2014). However, as a constitutional reform in 1960 granted suffrage to the Creole 
middle class (McAteer 2007: 282), the STLA, fearing a loss of prerogatives, called for self-
government without universal suffrage.  
This was the context of the foundation of the two key parties. The first, the Seychelles Peo-
ple’s United Party (SPUP), was registered in 1964 after being founded earlier in England by 
France-Albert René (Shillington 2014). René was the son of a plantation administrator. Sup-
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4 DANIEL KÜNZLER 
posed to study priesthood at the Capuchin Seminary of St Maurice in Switzerland, he went to 
England to study law instead. Following courses at the London School of Economics and ha-
ving contacts in the Labour Party, the Fabian Society and among French intellectuals, he was 
exposed to leftist ideas. “The broad political focus of the SPUP included full independence 
from Britain, popular democracy based on general elections, the development of a welfare 
state, agricultural and fisheries development, equal opportunities, the encouragement of pri-
vate investment and the defence of the majority’s right to control the country” (Campling et 
al. 2011: 15).5  
The second key party, the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP), was created in 1964 by the 
Sino-French Seychellois James Mancham and promoted integration with Great Britain to 
counter self-government as advocated by the STLA and independence as demanded by the 
SPUP (Campling et al. 2011: 14). In 1967 universal adult suffrage was finally introduced; the 
colony was granted more administrative responsibility three years later. The popular vote was 
divided between the two big parties. However, the first-past-the-post electoral system resulted 
in a comfortable majority of seats for the SDP (Scarr 2000: 176f.). Well aware of this, the Brit-
ish imposed a government of national unity with Mancham as president and René as prime 
minister as terms for independence on 29 June 1976. As president, Mancham had power over 
internal security, could appoint the cabinet and dissolve parliament (McAteer 2008: 373). Al-
ready before independence, the British were concerned that Mancham might use his power to 
get rid of the opposition and form a one-party state (Shillington 2014: 180). 
One of the central political issues was the deep division of Seychelles society, which be-
came manifest when the international airport was constructed by the British in 1971 on land 
reclaimed from the sea.6 Mancham was an ardent promoter of the airport, not least because of 
his own international jet-set playboy life.7 Being a merchant’s son and friendly to business 
interests, Mancham was keen on attracting international investments. René preferred a prima-
ry focus on agricultural development and was rather hostile towards the airport, fearing the 
negative side effects of tourism and the airport’s potential role in an armed conflict.  
In this context of deep political cleavages and fears of an authoritarian turn by Mancham, 
there was anxiety among many supporters of the SPUP. René dropped hints about change to 
come, and there were rumours that he was plotting something (Shillington 2014: 202). Few, 
however, knew that René and a small group of intimates were secretly working on a concrete 
plan to overthrow Mancham. “René was determined that the coup should be seen to involve 
grassroots supports from throughout [the main island, dk] Mahé, so James Michel and a few 
others were sent round to recruit one volunteer from each of the twenty-three districts” (Shil-
lington 2014: 201). They were told to be ready for a special project and called up when 
Mancham, ignoring warnings, went to a Commonwealth meeting in England in June 1977. 
                                                      
5 The SPUP managed in 1973 to secure recognition from the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity 
as a liberation movement, resulting in financial support and international solidarity. 
6 Having potential military use in the back of their mind, the British constructed a runway long enough for contempo-
rary long-haul aircrafts. 
7 Being an international playboy and spending most of his time outside the country were among the reproaches René 
made against Mancham to justify the coup d’état. With some vanity, Mancham toyed with pleading guilty on the first point, 
not without returning the reproach of being a womanizer to René, adding that his opponent was satisfied with womanizing in 
the domestic “chicken yard” (Mancham 1983: 210). 
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René distributed the guns and uniforms he had smuggled into the country in his diplomatic 
baggage. Still, only half of the group of 33 putschists that went to take over the Mont Fleuri 
police armoury and the Central Police station were armed.8 Nevertheless, they succeeded and 
announced a “socialist revolution” on the radio. The takeover rather accidentally claimed two 
lives, not least because the country did then not have an army that could have countered it. 
René had the backing of “socialist” Tanzania and apparently also the blessing of France 
(Mancham 2015: 105). It took years until the population learned details about the events (Shil-
lington 2014: 215).  
Not only the main actors involved, but also many scientists describe the events as a social-
ist takeover (e.g. Franda 1982; Pryor 1990; Campling/Rosalie 2006; Baker 2008; Campling et 
al. 2011; Shillington 2014). Whether it can be considered a socialist revolution or not depends 
of course on the definition of a revolution. Many would include elements such as the seizure 
of power and the initiation of major social reforms (e.g. Giddens 1997: 503). While this was 
the case in the Seychelles, another key component of Giddens’ (1997: 503) definition is absent: 
there was no mass movement in the Seychelles. Other definitions would include a new domi-
nant ideology (e.g. Skocpol 1982: 265). In this perspective, there clearly was a revolution in the 
Seychelles. René, as shown later in this contribution, justified his policies with the ideology of 
a socialist avant-garde party. Less clear – and this is a weakness of the term revolution – is the 
question whether these reforms have to be coherent and successful to qualify for a revolution. 
No socialist society – however such a society might be defined – emerged on the Seychelles. 
While the universal social policies, presented in the next section, could qualify as socialist, the 
economic policies, presented in the following section, hardly do so. Given this policy mix, this 
contribution uses the label “socialist revolution” in quotation marks.  
Social policies before and after the “socialist revolution” 
Before presenting social policies in the Seychelles, it is important to put them into context. 
After the coup, a one-party state was institutionalized, there were elections without choice, 
and civil and political freedoms were removed (Franda 1982: 56-57). René increasingly con-
centrated power in his hands by gradually adding Finance, Planning and Foreign Relations to 
his ministerial portfolio. Furthermore, he controlled the composition of the central executive 
committee from 1984. Basically, René alone made government policies. Especially after an 
attempted counter-coup by South African mercenaries organized by exiled Seychellois and 
backed by the CIA (Kennedy/Pastorino 2015) and a mutiny in the army in 1982, he became 
increasingly authoritarian. Some old companions turned away from him. Those (supposedly) 
opposing him went to jail, some disappeared, and there were political murders at home and in 
exile, where thousands went. Real estate and businesses were partly nationalized. Some wit-
nesses of the period, not always neutral sources, assume that real estate and businesses were in 
fact put in the hands of a few families. They also describe a climate of anxiety and empty roads 
                                                      
8 This contribution follows Shillington (2014), who provides the most detailed account of the coup d’état. Franda (1982: 
49) puts the number at 60 Tanzanians and “120 more men”. 
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in the evenings (Mancham 2015). Despite its rhetoric of reconciliation, the government until 
now has never accounted for the past (see e.g. Boisbouvier 2016). 
This said, there were initially also widespread excitement and a spirit of optimism that led 
people to volunteer for community projects. This was fuelled by a cut in ministerial salaries, 
an increase in the minimum wage, and other popular decisions (Shillington 2014: 218). René 
introduced major social reforms justified by the ideology of a socialist avant-garde party. 
René’s social project was already outlined before the revolution. In a series of articles pub-
lished in 1964 in the SPUP’s newspaper “the People”, René emphasised policies such as pen-
sions for the elderly, free and compulsory education, free health care and a house-building 
programme among others (Shillington 2014: 102). This reflected several of Collet’s earlier 
recommendations. These key policies were also fundamental in the constitution of the Sey-
chelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF), as the SPUP was called from June 1978. Its aim was 
“to create a socialist state wherein all citizens, regardless of colour, class, race or creed, shall 
have equal opportunities and be afforded with the basic needs of life in a modern society, such 
as security of income, medical care, good and hygienic housing, free and compulsory educa-
tion, opportunities for the young and care for the aged” (SPPF 1982: xvii). These were not just 
empty words, as became clear to the population in the following years (Shillington 2014: 229): 
A social pension, free education and free health care were introduced and justified with social-
list ideals. This is in contrast to most other “socialist” countries which - with the exception of 
free education - actually rather focus on social insurance for workers and not on universal 
social assistance. Universal social policies were rather introduced in social democratic coun-
tries. The rest of the section describes the “socialist” social policies in more detail. In order to 
reveal continuities and discontinuities between these “socialist” and colonial social policies, 
this will be done providing some historical information. 
Concerning old age social security, in 1971 the colonial government introduced the Na-
tional Provident Fund (NPF), which catered for employees in the formal economy and pro-
vided a lump sum payment at retirement (Dayer 1974: 232; Campling et al. 2011: 76). When it 
was introduced, SPUP-members organized a protest march through Victoria, objecting the 5 
per cent salary deduction, described as a “way of taxing the workers to provide money for 
Mancham and his Ministers to travel abroad” (Shillington 2014: 151-152). This view was even 
shared by one SDP backbencher, Uzice, who also opposed Mancham’s “personal excesses” 
(Ostheimer 1975: 177). The available literature does not mention the reason behind the intro-
duction of the NPF. However, it did not happen as a reaction on pressure from below. There 
were no powerful unions of plantation or other workers during that time in the Seychelles. 
However, there were “fears among the administration that without improved social welfare, 
violent conflict might erupt” (Scarr 2000: 164). Pressure from below started to increase only in 
the early 1960s and increased with universal suffrage for all adults in 1967.9 However, it re-
                                                      
9 In 1963, David Joubert, aligned with Mancham, founded the Government Workers’ Union and later the Stevedore, 
Winchmen and Dock Workers’ Union (Shillington 2014: 95). The SPUP formed the Transport and General Workers’ Union 
in 1964 and later the Building and Construction Workers’ Union (Shillington 2014: 121-122). The first industrial disputes 
started shortly thereafter. “Much of this activity also had a distinct political flavour”, as the trade unions were politically affili-
ated (Campling et al. 2011: 66), almost equally to both main parties (McAteer 2008: 458). Those allied with the SPUP were 
more radical, and the members of the Stevedore, Winchmen and Dock Workers’ Union replaced Joubert with René as general 
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sulted in the creation of the Welfare and Social Services Department in 1967 (Campling et al. 
2011: 75) and probably also the introduction of the NPF in 1971. 
After the “socialist revolution”, in 1979 the SPUP replaced the NPF with the Social Securi-
ty Fund (SSF) (Campling et al. 2011: 78). The SSF pays citizens that have reached the age of 64 
years a regular pension independent of whether they paid contributions or not. This universal 
social pension also includes chronically ill or handicapped persons. It was complemented in 
1990-91 with the Seychelles Pension Scheme (SPS) that included a compulsory and a volun-
tary contributory pillar (Campling et al. 2011: 79). René was particularly concerned with the 
elderly and in the 1980s started to celebrate his birthday with an annual party where pension-
ers from every district were invited (Shillington 2014: 70, 259). His successor continued this 
habit.  
In the field of free health care, René’s party already advocated it in 1964, during the colo-
nial period (SPPF 1982: 18). Before that, reform-minded “socialist Governor” Selwyn-Clarke 
was far from being a socialist, but annoyed the grands blancs with his push for basic healthcare 
for plantation workers and expansion of health care facilities (McAteer 2008: 222). During the 
colonial period, parts of health care were indeed free. This became universal after the revolu-
tion, and private health care was banned (SPPF 1982: 192). New health care facilities on the 
district level were introduced. In this domain, the revolutionary policy fitted in well with the 
spirit of the Alma Ata declaration dominant in the international context (Künzler 2016: 11). 
In the domain of education, nine years of free universal education were introduced in 1980 
(SPPF 1982: 100). This is quite remarkable in an international context where many other 
countries started to introduce user fees (Künzler 2015).10 Compulsory education was one of 
the key demands of Collet during colonial times (McAteer 2008: 125). Officials considered the 
idea, but argued that it was too expensive. There were other educational reforms besides free 
compulsory education. For example, church-related schools were nationalized, new school-
houses were built and a free school meal was introduced (Shillington 2014: 229). The latter 
was also already demanded by Collet. 
Finally, another key sector of social policy was housing. Again, this was already a preoccu-
pation of the colonial administration and among the responsibilities of the Welfare and Social 
Services Department (Campling et al. 2011: 75). It was also a priority issue for René and men-
tioned in a newspaper interview he gave after the coup (SPPF 1982: 199). He wanted to en-
courage people to build their own houses by providing affordable mortgages and land that 
had been compulsorily purchased (Shillington 2014: 211, 216-217). In all likelihood, govern-
ment did compensate below market price, and these prices were furthermore put under pres-
sure by an overvalued exchange rate that made agricultural export unprofitable and pushed 
land onto the market (Pryor 1990: 234). The mortgages were financed with loans from the 
National Provident Fund (SPPF 1982: 64). This was a different housing policy compared to 
the state-owned blocks usually built in socialist countries. 
Quite remarkably, René’s dearest policy idea (see e.g., SPPF 1982: 130-132) was his most 
unpopular and failed spectacularly. With the introduction of a compulsory National Youth 
                                                                                                                                                                      
secretary (Scarr 2000: 174-175). The lack of unity among them surely made it more difficult to push for social reforms (Os-
theimer 1975: 177). 
10 Free education became more widespread with the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 (Künzler 2015). 
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Service (NYS), he wanted not only to promote national unity and socialist ideals, but also the 
appreciation of manual labour (Shillington 2014: 231, 238). Its introduction in 1979 saw the 
most massive protests against René during his whole presidency. The program was made op-
tional and the campuses were more centrally built than envisaged by René (Franda 1982: 94). 
The NYS was phased out in 1998. 
The economic development after the “socialist revolution” 
The NYS episode points to René’s pragmatism. The prime example of this was his skilled na-
vigating of the Cold War (Franda 1982: 117-125; Scarr 2000: 194-200; Campling and Rosalie 
2006: 121). The strategic location attracted both sides: the USA paid foreign currency for their 
satellite tracking station and the USSR for their passing warships. The country attracted con-
siderable foreign aid that was used to finance its policies. “In short, Seychelles has managed 
the difficult feat of introducing socialism with Western financial aid” (Pryor 1990: 243). In 
addition to development aid, social and other policies were financed by a growing economy 
that focused on three partly state-led, partly privately driven key sectors (tourism, fisheries 
and finances). As the rest of this section shows, René’s economic policies were non-dogmatic.  
The economic development of the Seychelles was triggered by the growth of tourism. As 
Graph 1 shows, the per capita income started to grow considerably with the opening of the 
airport in 1971.11 Within a few years, tourism replaced copra as the key economic sector. The 
graph also shows that the growth even accelerated after the revolution in 1977. These figures 
should not be taken at face value, but as an indication of a general trend that is undisputed. 
Indeed, René came to terms with tourism and did not kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. 
While several economic sectors were nationalized, this was less the case in tourism and private 
investment was still possible. However, tourism was controlled by government and focused on 
high-price tourism not destroying the idyllic landscape (Campling et al. 2011: 21). The num-
ber of yearly arrivals grew from fewer than 1,000 in 1960 to several 10,000s in the years before 
the coup (Campling et al. 2011: 17; Shillington 2014: 150). The early 1980s saw a short decline 
in the tourism sector, caused by the world economic crisis and also by the attempted counter-
coup mentioned (Franda 1982: 78; Campling et al. 2011: 22). Quality problems added to this. 
However, the tourism sector recuperated and in the mid-1990s, there were around 130,000 
yearly arrivals. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 again caused a slump also visible in Graph 1, 
but tourism quickly recovered and the number of yearly arrivals grew to more than 230,000 at 
present. The sector contributes a quarter to the national GNP and labour force (Michel 2014: 
364). However, much money leaves the country again, not least because the country imports 
90% of its consumption (Michel 2014: 218). There were a few unsuccessful attempts to indus-
trialize the country (Kaplinsky 1983: 205). They were quickly abandoned and the Seychelles 
continued to be open for the import of goods and capital. Self-reliance was not an option and 
never official policy. 
                                                      
11 In the framework of modernization theory, the colonial governor saw this investment as “practically the only example 
in the world of how concentrated and well administered aid can in a relatively short time bring an under-developed country 
to the economic ‘take-off’ point” (McAteer 2008: 342). 
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The success of tourism was somewhat to the detriment of the agricultural sector. René prag-
matically shifted away from his pre-coup focus on agricultural development, as unequal com-
petition in the labour and investment markets made plantations less productive and profitable 
(Campling et al. 2011: 21). This was less the case for the fisheries, a new key pillar of the coun-
try’s economy. As mentioned, this sector was one of the priorities of the SPUP, thus taking up 
earlier demands by Collet (see also Shillington 2014: 59, 124). The sector has considerable 
potential, given the huge size of the exclusive economic zone also mentioned above. Cold 
storage facilities and a cannery were developed. However, a huge boost did not come until a 
joint venture with Heinz European Seafood created in 1995 one of the largest tuna canneries 
in the world (Campling et al. 2011: 36). Around 2009, Somali piracy caused a drastic decrease 
in fisheries yields (Michel 2014: 57), which was reversed by the international measures against 
this piracy. The fisheries sector is important for foreign exchange, but not that labour-
intensive. 
Quite the same is true for the third key pillar of the economy, the financial sector. Infor-
mation on this sector is scant. There are indications suggesting that money laundering and tax 
evasion took place in the “socialist” Seychelles under René (Scarr 2000: 198). The former US-
ambassador Fischer, surely not the most neutral source, even claims that René organised off-
shore banking on the British Channel Islands when working for a bank in England in the early 
1960s and used his connections to Mafia structures to develop the sector on the Seychelles 
(Kennedy/Pastorino 2015). However, the financial sector grew even more after economic lib-
eralisation in 1994 (Campling et al. 2011: 37) and after the granting of immunity from crimi-
nal prosecution for large investors (Ellis/Shaw 2015: 516). Currently, there are an estimated 
140,000 offshore companies in the Seychelles. According to official figures, the financial sector 
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employs over 1,100 persons (2.4% of the labour force) and contributes 4.2% to the GNP 
(Michel 2014: 287). 
Expanding social policies in the context of liberalisation and democratic competition 
René’s pragmatism also let him announce a return to multiparty government in 1991 (Shil-
lington 2014: 274-275). Convinced of his re-election, he allowed Mancham to run in the pres-
idential election of 1993 and did beat him clearly. He also won the next two elections (Baker 
2008: 280). The election of 1998 saw Mancham being replaced by priest Wavel Ramkalawan as 
the most popular opposition politician. Ramkalawan merged his Parti Seselwa in 1994 with 
two others into the Seychelles National Party (SNP). However, multipartyism did not change 
much in the country. Concerning social policy, it even reinforced some “socialist” policies. 
Free health care and free compulsory education were preserved in the new constitution 
(Campling/Rosalie 2006: 119-120; Kirigia et al. 2007). Other programs were expanded, “which 
because of their timing and targeting (they were often discretionary in nature), have led some 
commentators to argue that they were geared towards achieving electoral success” (Campling 
et al. 2011: 80). 
Writing in 2006, Campling and Rosalie were concerned about the sustainability of welfare 
spending. Indeed, the country became increasingly indebted in the 1990s and got into an eco-
nomic crisis that peaked in the early 2000s. René had to privatise some public enterprises. 
However, many others have remained public until now (bus transportation, airline, ports, 
water, electricity, refuse, petrol, and some banks). René’s successor James Michel had to deal 
with another intensification of economic problems in 2007 and announced macroeconomic 
reforms including new taxes, a floating of the national currency rupee, and an IMF-led ad-
justment programme (Campling et al. 2011: 82-83).  
In contrast to most other examples, these reforms did not induce a demolition of social 
policies. On the contrary, free education policy continued, and besides school meals, there are 
also transport and laptop subsidies, allowances for post-secondary students and other forms 
of support. Free health care was also continued, and the services were expanded. The same is 
true for housing. Michel reported in subsequent State of the Nation addresses the progress of 
the promised housing units to be delivered, including the large-scale Perseverance Island pro-
ject (Michel 2014: 107, 207; 2016b). The declared long-term objective is that each Seychellois 
family is enabled to its own house. 
In the domain of old-age pensions, there have been reforms, but these again rather ex-
panded the benefits. In 2005 the SPS became an independent institution called Seychelles Pen-
sion Fund (SPF) and pays a monthly pension and no longer a lump sum. The SSF became the 
Agency for Social Protection (ASP) in 2008. Its CEO Marcus Simeon mentioned in an inter-
view on 21st December 2016 that the ASP gets one seventh of the governmental budget and 
the retirement pension alone receives 10 percent. The pension was raised in several steps from 
2,200 in December 2006 to 3,600 and its current level of 5,050 Rupees a month and is linked to 
the minimum wage (roughly 325 Euros). The second last hike was announced just before the 
presidential election of 2015, which James Michel won with a margin of a mere 193 votes and 
the last one just after these elections (Michel 2016b; Uranie/Vannier 2016). Since 2009, the 
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governing party SPPF is called Parti Lepep (Creole for “the people”). Both Lepep and the main 
opposition party SNP promised in their electoral manifestos to raise pensions (Lepep 2015: 
48; Seychelles Weekly 2015). Parts of the population even call for a 13th pension payment in 
analogy to the 13th salary that was demanded by the opposition and introduced for govern-
ment employees in January 2016 (Michel 2016b). Lepep aimed at applying this to the private 
sector as well and since 2017, private sector workers receive a conditional 13th month pay. 
While the SNP boycotted the parliamentary election in 2011, resulting in an overwhelming 
Lepep majority, it led an opposition coalition called Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS, Creole 
for “Seychellois Democratic Union”) into the 2016 elections and won a majority of seats. 
There was thus a cohabitation government, as president Michel was elected for Lepep. He 
later passed his office to his Vice President Danny Faure. Cohabitation potentially leads to 
stalemates. However, this seems not (yet) to have happened in the Seychelles, as own inter-
views in December 2016 with stakeholders from political parties and social security institu-
tions showed. The LDS wants to prove that it is a reliable alternative to Lepep and would gov-
ern responsibly if elected. For the first time, the budget is being thoroughly discussed in par-
liament, a novelty widely appreciated by stakeholders. The debates were broadcast on radio 
and television. This also attracted considerable interest among the general public, who were so 
keen to follow the debates that portable radios were allegedly sold out in Victoria. The conso-
lidation of the budget continued well into 2017. 
What could the cohabitation government mean for the future development of social poli-
cy? The LDS has a liberal orientation but prefers to question the implementation of key social 
policies rather than their universal principles. According to its manifesto (LDS 2016), the par-
ty aims at keeping “social assistance programs under review and remove partisan political 
considerations to ensure that all our people live free of poverty and do not face hardship be-
cause of lack of opportunity, personal disability, health or old age.” Its leader Roger Man-
cienne repeatedly emphasised in an interview with the author12 the acceptance of key social 
policies such as free education, free health care and social assistance by both the LDS and the 
population. However, he also emphasised repeatedly the need to improve the implementation 
of these policies and the need to avoid abuse. The need to improve implementation and avoid 
abuse was frequently mentioned by former president James Michel in his State of the Nation 
speeches (Michel 2014: 246; 473; 2016). Peter Sinon, Deputy Secretary-General of Parti Lepep, 
argued similarly in an interview, again adding that the universal social policies are generally 
accepted: “Free education, free health care and access to affordable housing, this social policy 
is the legacy of SPUP/SPPF/Lepep and not challenged by any other party. It cannot be wiped 
out.”13 After wrapping up the key argument, the next section turns to the challenges of the key 
universal social policies in the Seychelles. 
                                                      
12 Interview Roger Mancienne, leader Linyon Demokratik Seselwa, 22 December 2016. 
13 Interview Peter Sinon, Deputy Secretary-General Lepep, 22 December 2016. 
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A unique path to universal social policies and its future 
The “socialist revolution” in 1977 clearly discontinued colonial social policies in some fields. 
Concerning old age social security, a universal social pension replaced the lump sum payment 
at retirement for employees in the formal colonial economy. In the field of education, there 
were calls for compulsory education during colonial times, but free education was only intro-
duced after the “socialist revolution”. The universalisation of free health care was less radical 
as health care was already partly free during colonialism. There were other policy changes, 
among them a quite unusual housing policy. While this seems to point towards the im-
portance of revolutionary ideology for policies, the picture is more nuanced. 
The Seychelles stroke a unique path to universal social policies in two regards. First, the 
economy of the Seychelles was – in contrast to other plantation colonies – within a few years 
after independence no longer based on plantations, but on services (tourism, finance). This is 
also in contrast to other post-colonial “socialist” countries in sub-Saharan Africa, whose 
economies were based on agricultural, energy or mineral commodities. With an isolated and 
small domestic market, industrialisation was not an option and the Seychelles kept an open 
economy. Pragmatic and hardly “socialist” economic policies focused on three key sectors that 
were partly state-led, partly privately driven. Tourism, for example, was controlled by gov-
ernment without completely nationalising it. Continuous economic growth helped to finance 
social policies. In addition, the country also successfully navigated the Cold War by attracting 
capitalist development aid to finance “socialist” policies. Social policies contributed to a rela-
tively high standard of living and persisted throughout economic and political liberalisation. 
Second, the Seychelles are also unique when looking at the international literature on so-
cial policies. In other British plantation colonies such as Mauritius, British Guiana or Trinidad 
and Tobago, old-age pensions were introduced much earlier in reaction to strikes and riots 
between 1935 and the late 1940s (Seekings 2006, 2011). At that time, pressure from below 
lacked in the Seychelles, as there were no powerful unions of plantation or other workers. The 
dispersion of the plantations (and thus the workers) over many smaller islands might have 
contributed to this. Fears of social conflicts led the colonial administration to introduce the 
NPF, which was not a universal social pension. However, this was introduced in 1979. While 
this is late compared to plantation colonies such as Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago 
(Seekings 2008), it happened considerably before universal pensions became a global model 
(von Gliszczynski 2015). 
The universal social policies are generally accepted and will most likely not be challenged 
by the current cohabitation situation after the change of majority in parliament. On the con-
trary: domestic politics tend to lead to an expansion of social politics, as the example of the 
2015 election shows, where the main two parties both promised a higher pension in their 
manifestos. Nevertheless, there are three main challenges to these social policies. The first one 
is the ageing population. The median age is somewhat over 30 years and thus remarkably 
higher than most other African countries. While still younger than European societies, the 
Seychelles have an increasing need for old-age care. The precursor of the earliest nursing 
home dates back to the governorship of Fiennes just after World War I. Fiennes distributed 
monthly money to poor people, but also built a home for poor people that later became a go-
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vernment-run old-age home for those without means (McAteer 2008: 18).14 Before that, desti-
tute people were confined together with leprosy patients on an island. Currently, there are 
nine old-age homes that are not able to cope with the demand.15 The Seychelles introduced in 
1987 a home care program for the elderly and later expanded it to chronically ill persons and 
persons with disabilities (Campling et al. 2011: 80). To reduce abuse, the system was reformed 
in 2009. Basically, predominantly female family members are paid to provide home care for 
half a day or a full day. The second challenge is financial sustainability. The government not 
only uses 10 percent of its budget for the social pension, but also bears the increasing costs of 
the home care program. There are discussions about the introduction of a means test for the 
social pension or a higher retirement age, but such reforms are not popular among the elec-
torate. The third challenge is climate change, a fundamental threat to the coral islands of the 
archipelago. In the later years of his presidency, James Michel was diplomatically active in the 
name of Small Island Developmental States. However, his main interest was the vision of a 
blue economy (Michel 2016a). He argues that the conventional “landcentric approach” ig-
nores the fact that most of the earth’s surface is covered by oceans. These oceans contain a 
huge economic potential to produce energy, not only through offshore oil fields, but also 
through wind energy and the production of energy based on waves and currents. They also 
supply mineral resources and have a higher nutritional potential than is currently used. While 
Michel emphasised a combination of environment and economy, he did not consider the po-
tential conflict between these two interests. However, it might well take another revolution to 
preserve the “socialist” one he helped to build and sustain. 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Human Development Index HDI (2015) 
HDI 
rank 




Mean years of 
schooling 
Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita (2011 
ppp US$) 
3 Switzerland 0.930 83.0 15.8 12.8 56,431 
63 Mauritius 0.777 74.4 15.6 8.5 17,470 
64 Seychelles 0.772 73.1 13.4 9.4 23,300 
106 Botswana 0.698 64.5 12.5 8.9 16,646 
110 Gabon 0.684 64.4 12.5 7.8 16,367 
116 South Africa 0.666 57.4 13.6 9.9 12,122 
122 Cabo Verde 0.646 73.3 13.5 4.7 6,904 
187 Central African Republic 0.350 50.7 7.2 4.2 581 
188 Niger 0.348 61.4 5.4 1.5 908 
Note: Mauritius, the Seychelles, Botswana, Gabon, South Africa and Cabo Verde are the best 
scoring sub-Saharan African countries. For comparison, the two worst performers of the conti-
nent and Switzerland are added to the list. Source: UNDP 2015 
                                                      
14 While it was popularly known as “Kazern” (army barracks), this home, as McAteer (2008: 18) adds, “most probably 
placed Seychelles ahead of many other British colonies in their official attitudes to the poor”. Fiennes also introduced by 
ordinance the obligation of the Government, but also of direct relatives and employers to care for dependent people.  
15 Interview Marcus Simeon, CEO Agency for Social Protection, 21 December 2016. 
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Appendix 2: Poverty rates 
HDI 
rank 
Country Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 
ppp US$) 
% of population that is poor or low income 
(various years, 2011 ppp US$) 
3 Switzerland 56,431 0.25 
63 Mauritius 17,470 57.54 
64 Seychelles 23,300 23.59 
106 Botswana 16,646 77.17 
110 Gabon 16,367 83.51 
116 South Africa 12,122 72.63 
122 Cabo Verde 6,904 78.66 
187 Central African Republic 581 97.21 
188 Niger 908 99.02 
Note: poor live on US$ 2 or less a day, low income on US$ 2.01-10 daily. Source: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/ 
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